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The Generation of Memory 
Reflections on the "Me~nory BooiD" 
in ConteiDporary Historical Studies 
Jay Winter 
J ay Winter delivered thefollowing in the form of a lecture at the Canadian War 
Museum on 31 October 2000. A 
distinguished academic, Winter has been 
writing about the cultural history of the 
First World War for nearly three decades. 
He has taught at the University of 
Cambridge in England and is presently 
at Yale University. Since 1988, he has 
been a director of the Historial de la 
grande guerre in Peronne, an important war 
museum in northern France. In this capacity, he 
has become familiar with a great many institutions 
of war and military history around the world and 
he has great knowledge and familiarity with the 
important historical and intellectual debates that 
will be fundamental to the creation of a new 
Canadian War Museum, which is now slated to 
open in May 2005. 
Probably Winter's best-known book is Sites of 
Memory. Sites of Mourning: the Great War in 
"ll Thoever says memory, says Shoah." This 
V Vis the cryptic remark of one of the fathers 
of the memory boom among historians over the 
last 20 years, Pierre Nora, French political 
scientist, publisher at the prestigious house of 
Gallimard, and the agent provocateur and 
inspiration behind one of the most influential 
ventures in cultural history in the last 20 years, 
Les lieux de memoire. In a series of stately tomes, 
published between 1984 and 1992, Nora solicited 
and reshaped essays by leading French scholars 
which, taken together constitute an inventory of 
knowledge and conjecture about memory in the 
French historical context - memory as frozen in 
statues, in objects, in street names, in ceremonies, 
in political parties, in legends, in myths, even in 
historical works. The success of this venture has 
been astonishing. The collection has sold over half 
European Cultural History published in 
1995. In it, he argues that the rituals of 
mourning associated with 
commemoration after the First World War 
had a history stretching far back in human 
life and experience. In this he contradicts 
the thinking of Canadian historian Modris 
Eksteins who argued that the Great War 
marked the birth q_f the modern age. 
Lately, Daniel Sherman has proposed that 
commemorative ceremonies and memorials are 
significantly politicized in the interests q_f state 
control. In the following paper Winter warns against 
the dangers of collective memory being collapsed 
into "a set of stories formed by or about the state" 
while also providing a rich overview of the great 
importance that attention to memory and culture 
studies has taken on in contemporary thought. 
These cannot be ignored in any serious attempt to 
lay the intellectualfoundation of any new museum, 
and perhaps especially may have specific relevance 
to a new war museum. 
Laura Brandon 
a million copies in France alone. All of the essays 
have been translated into English, first in a three-
volume edition published by Columbia University 
Press under the slightly odd title of Realms of 
memory; all the other chapters will appear next 
year in a four-volume edition published by 
University of Chicago Press. An exploration of 
German sites of memory is under way; the same 
is true in Italy and Portugal; and everywhere in 
the Anglo-Saxon world, historians young and old 
have found in the subject of memory, defined in a 
host of ways, the central organizing concept of 
historical study, a position once occupied by the 
notions of class, race, and gender. These themes 
have certainly not vanished, but they have been 
reconfigured and in certain respects 
overshadowed by the historical study of"memory," 
however defined. 
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Clearly something important has happened in 
our discipline, something we need to attend to as 
more than a passing fashion. What are the origins 
of the "memory boom"? What are its implications? 
Is Nora right in claiming that it is one of the 
cultural repercussions of the Holocaust? In 
tonight's lecture I hope to show that the subject of 
the Holocaust has indeed inspired a range of 
reflections on the notion of memory, trauma, and 
history. But there are other, distinctive sources of 
the contemporary obsession with memory, which 
arise out of a multiplicity of social, cultural, 
medical and economic trends and developments 
of an eclectic but intersecting kind. My argument 
is that each of these incitements to reflection on 
memory has its own inner logic and constituency, 
but that the effect of their intersection is 
multiplicative rather than additive. In other words, 
the "memory boom" has taken off because the 
impulses behind it add up to a whole greater than 
the sum of its parts. 
1. Memory and commemoration 
One clear invitation to much reflection on memory has been public commemoration. 
Here marking or remembering the Holocaust is a 
critical problem, one mixed together in very 
troubling ways with other kinds of 
commemoration. It is apparent that remembering 
the Holocaust has formed a significant part of the 
commemoration of the victims of twentieth-
century war. The Holocaust, implemented between 
1941 and 1945, has neither been fully integrated 
nor has it escaped from that contextual location. 
A second concentric circle of remembrance 
surrounds both the Holocaust and the Second 
World War. It is the commemorative moment 
which preceded it, addressing some of the 
complex issues of victimhood and bereavement 
during and after the First World War. Taken 
together, these intersecting commemorations litter 
the calendar. In the Israeli calendar, Yom Hashoah 
comes one week before Remembrance day, a 
solemn recollection of Israeli soldiers who died 
in war from the period prior to the foundation of 
the State oflsrael until today. Yom Hazicharon is 
followed immediately and with a wrenching change 
of pace and mood by Israeli Independence Day. 
The link between sacrifice and redemption is 
clear; more on that theme in a moment. For 
observant Jews, Tisha Be'av is still the time on 
the Jewish calendar to recall the Third 
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catastrophe, the "Dritte Churbn," of the Nazi 
genocide, following the two prior disasters of the 
destruction of Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem in 
586BC and 70AD. On this day, redemption is 
linked not to the creation of the State of Israel, 
but to the record of catastrophe over two millenia, 
a record recalled with sadness and longing for 
the day when the Messiah will arrive. "Even though 
he tarries," the affirmation of faith accepts, 
"nonetheless I still believe." Redemption here has 
a direct, scriptural meaning. 
How redemptive is the notation of the other 
moments we recall on stated days of the year 
marking wars? There is D-Day, VE-day, VJ day, 
and the two older standbys, America's Memorial 
Day, on 29 May, the anniversary of Appomattox, 
and everyone's Armistice Day on 11 November. 
In parts of Britain and Northern Ireland, the 1st 
of July, the anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, 
is marked collectively, as is dawn on 25 April, the 
day Australian and New Zealand troops landed at 
Gallipoli; today that day is Australian 
independence day. Most are framed within a 
narrative of liberty being purchased through the 
shedding of blood. Here, as in Israeli 
independence day, the measure is the nation state 
and its hard-won expression of a nation's collective 
life. And now we have 27 January, the day 
Auschwitz was liberated by the Red army. Here 
too commemoration cannot escape its political 
framework. State-sponsored commemoration is 
a politically sanctioned and politically funded rite 
of remembering in public, adjusted to a publicly 
or politically approved narrative. Remembering 
the Holocaust at this level is an extension of earlier 
twentieth-century commemorative forms. It 
locates the narrative of war crimes and victimhood 
within the framework of national catastrophe and 
national rebirth. 
The case of the new Holocaust memorial to 
be built near the Brandenburg gate in Berlin shows 
the implications of this commemorative setting. 
The monument, a stone's throw from the new 
Reichstag and from Hitler's bunker, is unavoidably 
part of the story of Germany reborn. Some believe 
the monument is an essential and properly-placed 
part of the story; others, and I am one of them, 
opposed the location of a commemorative 
monument to victims of the Holocaust within such 
a narrative. Placing the monument in the heart of 
the national capital, geographically and 
metaphorically, also draws attention away from 
many original and sensitive commemorative forms 
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in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Focussing 
on the national level of notation, in my view, 
wrongly configures the problem of how to 
remember the victims of the Holocaust. The 
alternative to a national monument is not nothing; 
indeed the array of local, small-scale 
commemorative forms are entirely consistent with 
the federal, regionalized, richly complex nature 
of German cultural history, and helps show the 
multiplicity of meanings of remembrance, and 
indeed of history, lost in grand national narratives 
like that of Daniel Goldhagen. 
What is true of Germany, is true of all other 
parts of Europe where memorials have been built. 
In Oradour-sur-Glane, or in Draney, or on the 
walls of the Jewish orphanage on the Ile St-Louis, 
monuments and inscriptions help locate the 
Holocaust within the particular, local context of 
the scars left by total war in the twentieth century. 
None of these sites can "re-present" the Holocaust; 
nothing can do so in any conventional way. All 
they can accomplish and it is a lot is to 
suggest what is absent in European life because 
of the genocide, and to leave the question of its 
"meaning," if any, open. Daniel Liebeskind's design 
for the Jewish wing of the Berlin Historical 
Museum in Kreuzfeld goes a long way towards 
describing this void. 
But absence is not meaning. My own view is 
that it is unwise to try to encapsulate the Holocaust 
within any particular system of meaning. To 
paraphrase Primo Levi, a set of events about which 
one cannot pose the question of"why?" is also an 
event about which it is impossible in any 
straightforward sense to pose the questions of 
historical context or meaning within twentieth-
century history. 
This extended international conversation as 
to the appropriate character and content of 
Holocaust commemoration is bound to go on, and 
I do not expect to persuade everyone in the 
audience tonight of my point of view. But for our 
present purposes, what is most significant about 
this protracted debate is the way it has made us 
reflect both on the notion of memory and on what 
kind of memories are elicited by other 
commemorative projects? 
Whatever you think of these issues, it is clear 
that the political debate over Holocaust 
commemoration describes one very salient 
element in the "memory boom" of the last 30 years. 
Nora had a point. But the national political focus 
of this story is somewhat misleading. The state is 
not the sole nor even the primary source of the 
recent upsurge of interest in memory, whether or 
not related to the Holocaust. Once again, we have 
to address processes which arise from many 
different sources, some at the seat of power, some 
not. 
State agents, as much as those dedicated to a 
state in the making, have an evident interest in 
legitimating narratives; very often that is what they 
mean by "collective memory" stories that polish 
the cultural credentials of their claim to power. 
But memory work has focussed on other 
collectives too. The new Viennese memorial to 
victims of the Holocaust, an installation designed 
by Rachel Whiteread is a case in point; it is a very 
successful urban memorial. There are many 
others. 
The nation is only player in this 
commemorative ensemble. In some places (though 
not in others) over the past 30 years, globalization 
and European integration have, to a degree, 
diminished the stridency of some national 
narratives. In other cases, nationalism is a direct 
response to the perceived dangers of globalization. 
The world wide net, many French observers sadly 
note, is yet another defi americain, threatening 
the extinction of the Francophone world. 
Nationalist rhetoric has certainly not vanished, 
but it increasingly shares the stage with other 
languages of collective identity. The much-
heralded end of territoriality has not yet arrived, 
but state-bounded narratives increasingly compete 
with others of a regional or ethnic kind. On both 
sides of the Atlantic, in the developed "north" and 
the developing "south," many ethnic groups and 
disenfranchised minorities have demanded their 
own right to speak, to act, and to achieve liberation 
or self-determination. And those struggles almost 
always entail the construction of their own stories, 
their own usable past. Collective memory is a term 
that should never be collapsed into a set of stories 
formed by or about the state. 
2. Identity politics 
H ere is a second source of the robust character of what I have called the 
"generation of memory." The creation and 
dissemination of narratives about the past arise 
out of and express identity politics. One clear 
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example is the placement of the National Holocaust 
Memorial on the Mall in Washington. It is, in this 
sacred space, both a statement of universal truths, 
and an expression of Jewish-American pride. 
Borrowing the notation of one literary scholar in 
an entirely different context, the museum 
expresses a measureless story in a grammar living 
on the hyphen, the hyphen of ethnic politics. 
The United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum is a spectacular success in many ways, 
drawing a huge and varied population of visitors. 
Its structure and organization constitute a great 
achievement, bringing to millions of people of all 
ages searing images of a crime without parallel. 
Handing out identity cards of Holocaust victims 
to visitors inscribes us from the outset in a family 
of bereavement, which among other things, is a 
Jewish family. Ethnic pride and ethnic sadness 
are there in equal parts. 
But the framework cannot escape from its 
location. The redemptive elements in the story 
surround it on the Mall. They tell us of the wider 
struggle for tolerance, for freedom of religion, for 
freedom from persecution; they locate the 
Holocaust within the American narrative, itself 
configured as a universal. Here we have arrived 
at the right-hand side of the hyphen "Jewish-
American." The museum is the bridge between 
the two. There have been many other 
instances of commemoration as an expression of 
the tragic history of persecuted minorities. The 
Aids quilt is one; monuments to the struggle for 
African-American freedom raise the same point. 
Recent attempts to configure the imprisonment 
of Japanese-Americans during the Second World 
War express the same set of issues, both unique 
and universal. Again the hyphen of identity is 
strengthened by commemoration. 
In Latin America and elsewhere, testimonial 
literature rescues histories trampled on by 
military dictatorships. The stories of cruelty and 
oppression once retold, constitute acts of defiance; 
through the narrator, the voices of the dead and 
the mutilated can still be heard. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Mrica has 
been a focus for the release of imprisoned memory. 
At times, the boundaries between truth and fiction 
become blurred in such story-telling. As Doris 
Sommer has put it, the boundaries between 
informing and performing are porous. But even 
when the storyteller goes beyond what can be 
verified through other sources, the voice of the 
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witness still stands for a generalized sense of 
oppression. Here is identity politics as a set of 
narratives, a "counterhistory that challenges the 
false generalizations in exclusionary "History"," 
penned by those trapped in a Euro-centric and 
imperialist sense of what constitutes the past. This 
dimension of the "memory boom" has little 
purchase with respect to Holocaust testimonies, 
but it tells us much about other narratives of 
oppression. 
Developments in information technology also 
help explain why the "memory boom" has taken 
off over the last generation. Since the 1960s and 
1970s, audio-visual and now computer-based data 
banks can preserve and protect the "voice" of the 
victims. Their stories can be captured, and 
through listening to them or viewing them, we can 
come into contact with their lives and their 
tragedies. 
The act of attending to such voices is what 
witnessing is all about. Its religious overtones are 
hard to miss. There is a kind oflaying on of hands 
in such encounters. The person who suffered 
knows about a mystery- the mystery of evil and 
the miracle of survival- and we who listen may 
thereby enter the mystery and share the miracle. 
This is a difficult area to investigate, for in it there 
is a kind of appropriation of suffering which raises 
many difficult moral questions. Dominick 
LaCapra refers to such forms of witnessing in the 
language of psychoanalysis. But I doubt if 
"transference" can really be a framework for those 
telling and those attending to such narratives. 
Over the same decades that archives of 
Holocaust victims and other survivors of 
oppression and injustice were constructed, the 
notion of the "witness" received another kind of 
validation. From the Eichmann trial in 1961 to 
the French trials of Barbie, Touvier and Papon, 
witnesses came forward, men like Leon Welizcker-
Wells who made it his purpose in life to tell the 
story of what had happened to him as a member 
of a Sondercommando. Literary memoirs became 
acts of witnessing; the success of Primo Levi's 
writing is a case in point. 
Timing is critical here. In the 1940s and 
1950s, such witnesses were there, but their voices 
were marginal to public discourse on the Second 
World War. Heroic narratives of Resistance were 
more useful in the revival of the political culture 
of countries humiliated by occupation and 
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collaboration. But by the 1960s and 1970s, that 
narrative work had done its job; the transition to 
post-war political stability was complete. There 
was now room for the victims of the camps to 
come forward. And come forward they did. 
Some of their messages reinforced identity 
politics, in particular the ongoing struggle against 
anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial. But in other 
ways, the birth of the witness was the recovery of 
voices that had been there all along. It was the 
disclosure of narratives which did not fit the heroic 
model of the Resistance. Witnessing was another 
kind, perhaps an even harder kind, of resistance. 
Identity politics attended the recovery of 
witnesses after the Soviet empire collapsed in 
1989. A whole swathe of Eastern Europe suddenly 
was stripped ofits politically-dominant narratives. 
Berlin was now unified in contemplation of a single 
past. From Potsdam to Moscow, vast arrays of 
documents suddenly surfaced, and helped fuel a 
new and vigorous recovery of the experience of 
several generations of men and women whose 
voices had been stilled. In the 1990s, these 
witnesses could be heard. Alongside them are 
Chinese voices, less attesting to identity politics 
than to the brutal repression of the cultural 
revolution and Tienanmen Square. Simply 
recording all these stories will take decades. But 
in the course of doing so, scholars are helping to 
build up new political and ethnic identities in a 
number of volatile regions. 
3. Mfluence and commemoration 
Ihave tried to emphasise the multifaceted and eclectic nature of the "memory boom." There 
have been political, technological, and 
philosophical impulses towards privileging the 
subject of memory in many discursive fields. In a 
moment, I will address what a demographer would 
call "cohort analysis"- the tracing of generations 
and the stories they tell over time. There is a 
medical dimension to this story to which I shall 
also turn albeit briefly. These are the most 
important aspects of the efflorescence of interest 
in memory I want to describe tonight. The braiding 
together of these varied themes is a classic 
problem in over-determination. 
But there is yet another dimension to this story 
to which we must attend. It is more about 
audiences than about origins, and while not of 
fundamental significance, it still is part of the story 
of why so many people are talking about "memory" 
today. In the west, one important precondition of 
the "memory boom" has been affluence. In a 
nutshell, rising real incomes and increased 
expenditure on education since the Second World 
War have helped shift to the right the demand 
curve for cultural commodities. 
In the history of this rising demand, higher 
education has played a central role. Since the 
1960s there has been a rapid expansion in the 
population of university-trained people, whose 
education provided them with access to and a 
desire for cultural activities of varying kinds. In 
Britain the number of university students 
expanded very rapidly after the Robbins report of 
1963, granting the right to free higher education 
to all who could pass entrance requirements. 
There were at least three times as many people 
studying in institutions of higher education in 
1990 as had been there 30 years before. 
The same upward trend in the size of the 
tertiary sector of education may be detected across 
Europe and in the United States after 1960. Part 
of the increase is demographic: the "baby boom" 
generation was coming of age; but there was more 
at work here than the shadow of post -war fertility. 
Systems of higher education differ markedly, but 
even with a host of qualifications, the international 
trend is evident. There were eight times the 
number of students in higher education in 
Germany in 1990 compared to 1960; in France, 
six times more over the same period; in Italy, 
Belgium and Denmark, and the United States, 5 
times more. Taken together, the 15 member states 
of the European Union had 12 million students 
in higher education in 1990; there were about 13.5 
million such students in the United States. And 
the numbers have continued to grow throughout 
the last decade ofthe twentieth century. 
The student revolt of 1968 was an effect, not 
a cause, of this trend. In France, student numbers 
grew more rapidly in 1966-7 than in 1969-70; 
German growth was about the same before and 
after the "troubles," precipitated in part by rising 
numbers and insufficient resources devoted to 
them. Changes in higher education had 
fundamental effects not only on the skill 
composition of the labor force, but also on the 
stock of cultural capital circulating in society as a 
whole. By the 1990s there was a larger population 
of university-educated people than ever before. 
61 
5
Winter: The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the “Memory Boom” in Con
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2001
Their demand for cultural products of many 
different kinds was evident. What might be 
described as the industry of culture was in an ideal 
position for massive growth. The market was 
there; the target population for cultural products 
was there; and after two decades of retrenchment, 
state support for "heritage" or le patrimoine was 
there, with greater or lesser degrees of generosity. 
The British economic historian, Alan Milward, 
currently teaching in Florence, has pointed to the 
material echoes of these two cultural bywords, 
"heritage" and "patrimony." The "memory boom," 
he rightly notes, has happened in part because 
both the public and the state have the disposable 
income to pay for it. This is how Milward put it in 
a recent review of books on memory and history 
in Europe in The Times Literary Supplement: 
The media are the hypermarket outlet for 
the consumption of memory. Stern moral and 
methodological rejection of earlier historical 
fashions does not alter the reality that this latest 
fashion, like the earlier ones, is driven by the 
all-too-positivist forces of the growth of wealth 
and incomes. The history of memory represents 
that stage of consumption in which the latest 
product, ego-history, is the image of the self not 
only marketed but also consumed by the self. 
There are differences among European 
countries, but in the British and French cases, 
which I know best, there is a symmetry between 
economic trends and cultural trends which we 
ignore at our peril. 
Dwelling on memory is a matter of both 
disposable income and leisure time. Milward has 
a telling point: affluence has helped turn identity 
into a commodity, to be consumed by everyone at 
her (increasingly ample) leisure time. A "common" 
identity is one sharing a set of narratives about 
the past. Many of these take the form of bricks 
and mortar - fixed cultural capital. Exploiting 
their attractiveness, as in Britain's National Trust 
stately homes and gardens, the patrimony or 
heritage trades became a profitable industry, with 
market niches and target consumers. The 
marketing of memory has paid off, in a huge 
consumer boom in images of the past- in films, 
books, articles, and more recently on the internet 
and television. There is an entire industry devoted 
to "blockbuster exhibitions" in museums, whose 
visitors seem to respond more and more to 
spectacular shows. History sells, especially well 
as biography or as auto-biography, or in Milward's 
(and Pierre Nora's phrase) ego-history. 
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The British satirical writer Julian Barnes 
produced a marvelous reductio ad absurdum of 
this phenomenon in his futuristic spoof England, 
England, published in 1998. Why should tourists 
have to travel to consume the icons of British 
history? Surely it makes more sense to bring or 
imitate the lot on the Isle of Wight? But whatever 
its potential for humour, the history business has 
never been more profitable. It would be important, 
though, to have more precise information of the 
choices cultural consumers make. My hunch is 
that over the last two decades, the growth rate in 
attendance at the Imperial War Museum, the 
British Museum, and Madame Tussaud's in 
London, for instance, has been greater than the 
increase in attendance at sporting events or rock 
concerts. This is a conjecture, but one worth 
pursuing in a more rigorous manner. 
Affluence has had another by now 
commonplace byproduct. One vector of the 
"memory boom" may also be the exteriorization, 
or expression in public space, of the interior 
discourse of psychoanalysis. Just as Woody Allen 
has popularized therapy as an addictive way of 
life. so the nearly universal spread of therapy 
cultures have made memory a light consumer 
durable good for those - yet again - with the 
cash to afford it. 
3. History and family history: 
Vectors of transmission 
So far I have tried to sketch some of the political and economic pre-conditions for the 
contemporary "memory boom." But there is 
another level of significance in this story, one which 
is more demographic than political, more about 
families than about nations. 
In our profession, we should be grateful that 
history sells; one reason that it is such a popular 
and money-making trade is because it locates 
family stories in bigger, more universal, narratives. 
One way to understand the huge growth and 
financial viability of museums and fiction set in 
the wars of the twentieth century is to see them as 
places where family stories are set in a wider, at 
times universal context. Some grandparents knew 
the Blitz; now they can bring their grandchildren 
to the "Blitz experience" of the Imperial War 
Museum in London. Such imaginings of war are 
attractive because they rest on the contemporary 
link between generations, and in particular 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss3/5
between the old and the young, between 
grandparents and grandchildren, at times over the 
heads of the troublesome generation of parents 
in the middle. In the 1960s and 1970s, this link 
pointed back to the First World War; later on, to 
the Second. 
Many best-selling novels set in the two world 
wars take family stories as their form. Examples 
abound: like Jean Rouaud's Champs d'honneur 
winner of the Prix Goncourt in 1991, or Sebastian 
Japrisot's moving Un long dimanche de 
jian.;:aille, or Pat Barker's fictional trilogy on the 
Great War, or Sebastian Faulks's powerful 
Birdsong. Barker has written a sequel whose 
central figure is a l 00-year old veteran and father 
of the narrator. Faulks has placed within a later 
novel about the Second World War a story of the 
transmission of traumatic memory between father 
and daughter. 
There are deep traces here of the history of 
several cohorts, moving through time, across this 
fictional landscape. Today's grandparents were 
children after the 1914-18 war, and their stories 
-family stories- are now imbedded in history, 
and fiction, and exhibitions, and museums, and 
pilgrimage, in all the stuff of ritual that deepen 
the "memory boom." The linkage between the 
young and the old now extended substantially 
with the life span- is so central to the concept of 
memory that its significance may have simply 
passed us by. 
Let me take a moment to describe a personal 
experience which illustrates this point. I have been 
privileged to work as one of the creators of an 
international museum of the First World War, 
located at Peronne, in the Department of the 
Somme, an hour north of Paris. Peronne was 
German headquarters during the Battle of the 
Somme in 1916. This museum was the product 
of a specific and fleeting generational moment in 
the 1980s, when history became family history, 
and therefore could include scripts not yet 
inscribed by the French in their national narrative 
of the war. Because of family memories, and 
traumatic memories at that, we were able to find 
a way to justify a major French investment in a 
story very few Frenchmen had acknowledged as 
of fundamental importance to them and to their 
sense of the past. Verdun, that other great disaster 
of 1916, had occluded the Somme in France, 
despite the fact that the French lost 200,000 men 
in the battle. 
The man who saw this opportunity was Max 
Lejeune, president of the Conseil General, and a 
former Defence Minister at the time of Suez. He 
was a characteristic Fourth Republic politician, 
skilled in the byways of Parisian infighting, but 
whose power rested on a personal fiefdom and 
following in his own Department of the Somme. 
Tourism mattered to him, but so did the memory 
of his father, an ancien combattant of the Battle 
of the Somme, who had returned from the war a 
troubled man. The childhood Lejeune recalled was 
not a happy one; the war had broken his father, 
and a lifetimes later in the 1980s, his son Max 
Lejeune wanted to find a way to put those 
memories to rest. 
For Lejeune, the idea of a museum originated 
in family history, his family history. But his insight 
was in seeing that such a museum was a means 
of turning national narratives into family 
narratives, redolent to a very wide public of several 
nationalities. In this way, this venture could bring 
French children at the end of the twentieth century 
into contact with the world of his childhood, in 
the 1920s and 1930s, shadowed as it was by the 
Great War. It could also describe the disintegration 
of Europe in 1914-18 in a way which highlighted 
the urgent tasks of European integration 80 years 
later. It could combine nostalgia, ever-present in 
family narratives, with a civics lesson in the future 
of the new Europe. 
With the support of a notable of the eminence 
and power of Lejeune, it was possible to secure 
the fmancial investment necessary for the creation 
of a museum. Ultimately, the project cost 100 
million francs. Lejeune also bought the argument, 
and inserted it in the budget where it has remained 
to this day, that a museum without a research 
centre would atrophy over time. Placing historical 
debate permanently within the museum, and 
funding postgraduate studies for people anywhere 
in the world working on the Great War, are steps 
which have invigorated the enterprise and ensured 
its survival. Without family history (and French 
cash), none of this would have been possible. 
This positive story should not obscure other, 
more difficult, ways in which memories of war 
continue to linger even now, more than half a 
century after 1945. The "memory boom" has 
enabled some people to hide one set of memories 
behind another. In France and elsewhere, some 
narratives of the First World War help people evade 
both personal and national stories about the 
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Second World War. This is by no means true 
everywhere; in Russia, for example, the First 
World War simply vanished as a subject of public 
discourse, eclipsed by the Revolutions of 1917 
and the civil war which followed it. But where 
Collaboration raised uncomfortable questions in 
the aftermath of the Second World War, many 
people were happy to sing along with the French 
troubadour Georges Brassens, "Qu'est-ce que c'est 
la guerre que je prefere, c'est la guerre de "14-
18." 
4. Family memory, traumatic 
memory, and war 
Here the diversion of the narrative from one war 
to another was deliberate. Other people were not 
so fortunate. When we encounter family stories 
about war in this century, we frequently confront 
another kind of story-telling, one we have come to 
call "traumatic memory." The recognition of the 
significance of this kind of memory is one of the 
salient features of the contemporary "memory 
boom" I take this term to signify an underground 
river of recollection, first discussed in the 
aftermath of the First World War, but a subject of 
increasing attention in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
post-traumatic stress disorder became the 
umbrella term for those (as it were) stuck in the 
past. The "memory boom" of the later twentieth 
century arrived in part because of our belated but 
real acceptance that among us, within our families, 
there are men and women overwhelmed by 
traumatic recollection. 
War veterans bore the scars of such memories 
even when they did not have a scratch on them. 
The imagery of the shell-shocked soldier became 
generalized after the Second World War. In 1939-
45, the new notation for psychological casualty 
was "combat fatigue," an unavoidable wearing out 
of one of the components of the military machine. 
Holocaust victims had a very different story to tell, 
but the earlier vocabulary of trauma was there to 
be seized. And seized again. This was true in 
commemorative art as much as in medical care. 
It is no accident, in my view, that the notation of 
Maya Lin's Vietnam Veterans Memorial is that of 
Sir Edwin Lutyens's monument to the missing of 
the Battle of the Somme at Thiepval. The Great 
War created categories which have framed much 
of the language we use to describe the traumatic 
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memories ofvictims of the Second World War, the 
Vietnam war and other conflicts. 
This is also the case in the field of psychiatry, 
where the notion of post-traumatic stress disorder 
- previously termed "shell shock" or "combat 
fatigue"- was accepted as a recognized medical 
diagnostic classification only in 1980, a few years 
after the end of the Vietnam war. Once accepted 
as a syndrome, PTSD validated entitlements -to 
pensions, to medical care, to public sympathy. It 
also "naturalized" the status of Vietnam veterans. 
The mental scars of Vietnam vets, once 
legitimated, could be treated alongside other 
victims of urban violence, or sexual or family 
trauma. In all these cases, violence seemed to leave 
an imprint we now call "traumatic memory." 
In this area, enormous progress has been 
made over the last 30 years in the field of 
neuroscience. The biochemistry of traumatic 
memory is now a field of active research, and 
various pathways have been identified which help 
us distinguish between different kinds of memory 
traces. There is now a biochemistry of traumatic 
memories, memories which are first buried and 
then involuntarily released when triggered by 
certain external stimuli. The world of neurology 
has had its own "memory boom" which in turn 
has helped establish the scientific character and 
credentials of the notion of "trauma." 
Fiction and fictionalized memoirs have also 
been important vectors for the dissemination of 
notions of traumatic memory. This has been true 
since the Great War, and the appearance in print 
of the poems of Wilfred Owen, who did not survive 
the war, and Ivor Gurney, who did, but who spent 
the rest of his life in a lunatic asylum. Some 
veterans may have retreated into silence, but there 
were many storytellers among them, and among 
their contemporaries, who to this day continue to 
teach us much about what "trauma" means. 
Virginia Woolfs Mrs Dalloway of 1925 is one 
poignant example, the figure of Septimus Smith 
was drawn from her encounter with her brother-
in-law and his condition. If time permitted, I would 
love to dwell on a number of other story-tellers 
and their role in the public understanding of 
traumatic memory as a fact of twentieth-century 
family life. Two recent books, David Grossman's 
"See under Love" and Peter Balakian's "The Black 
Dog of Fate," are wonderful evocations of this 
mood of remembrance. 
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5. The "cultural turn" in 
historical studies 
T he memory boom of the late twentieth century is a reflection of a complex matrix of 
suffering, political activity, claims for entitlement, 
scientific research, philosophical reflection, and 
art. 
In conclusion, it may be useful to add a few 
words about the intersection of these broad trends 
with a number of narrower movements within the 
historical profession itself. The first may be 
described under the heading of "the cultural turn" 
in historical studies. When I was an undergraduate 
at Columbia, 40 years ago, cultural history was a 
form of Geistesgeschichte, a noble tradition in 
which German intellectual history was of central 
importance. Just emerging in the mid-1960s was 
an exciting mixture of disciplines to challenge the 
prevailing consensus; it came in many forms, but 
probably is best summarized as social scientific 
history. Over the next two decades historical 
demography and other forms of sociologically- or 
anthropologically-inspired historical study 
proliferated. Alongside them was a politically-
committed variation of Marxist thinking which 
created labour history. The now essential 
historical journal Past & Present was initially sub-
titled "ajournal of scientific history." The sub-
titled was discarded; the journal thrived. These 
strands of historiographical innovation produced 
work of outstanding and enduring quality. But as 
broad programmes of historical interpretation, 
both of these schools failed to deliver the goods 
they had promised. There was no new paradigm 
like that of the Annales school of the 1920s and 
1930s, promising total history. Instead, the 
positivist assumptions of social scientific history 
and the heroic narratives of the making of the 
working class, wherever it happened to be, began 
to fade by the 1970s and 1980s. 
Even in Paris, where the phrase "nous les 
Annales" still echoed magisterially, the hold of the 
old ways of thinking began to loosen. Part of the 
challenge came from post-modernists, fed up with 
the grand narratives of industrialization or other 
forms of linear progress, or unprepared to go on 
charting the history of militancy, or the 
transformation of a "class in itself' to a "class for 
itself." The inspiration behind Les lieux de 
memoire was political. After the collapse of the 
twin stars in the Parisian firmament, Gaullism 
and communism, many scholars of contemporary 
history, including Pierre Nora, sought a 
reorientation of their outlook through a reflection 
on what being French entails. And that meant 
seeking out the multiple sites of what he termed 
French "memory." 
In North America, part of the "cultural turn" 
reflected the way the neighbors began to colonize 
h~st~~- We sho~ld_note in particular the increasing 
s1gmf1cance w1thm historical study of literary 
scholarship, offering fundamental contributions 
to the cultural history of the First World War, at 
least in the Anglo-Saxon world. Feminist scholars 
have brought to this subject and to many others 
powerful new perspectives. No one today writes 
about the cultural history of imperialism without 
some meditation on the work of Edward Said and 
some reflection on that protean concept, 
"Orientalism." And one need not agree with 
everything Steven Greenblatt has had to say in 
order to appreciate the excitement of his ideas 
and those of his colleagues at Berkeley who edit 
the journal Representations. There were as many 
panels on subjects in cultural history at the 1999 
Modern Languages Association meeting in San 
Francisco as there were at the American Historical 
Association meeting in Chicago the following year. 
Where once French or French-inspired 
historians had sought out clues towards the 
features of the unchanging mental furniture of a 
society, loosely defined as mentalite, by the late 
1980s many were looking at language and 
representations. Roger Chartier has helped bury 
the outmoded distinction in cultural history 
between "superstructure" and "substructure" by 
insisting that "The representations of the social 
world themselves are the constituents of social 
reality." Gareth Stedman Jones echoed the same 
point in his influential study Languages of Class, 
~ublishe~ in 1983. German scholars, following 
first Remhard Koselleck, in the study of 
Begriffsgeschichte, or historical semantics, or 
following the work of Jan Assmann and Aleida 
Assmann, have created an entire literature in the 
field of cultural memory. And these seminal works 
are but the crest of a much wider wave of 
scholarship they have inspired and informed. 
Globalization is evident in the spread of these 
approaches to the study of memory. Saul 
Friedlander and his students in Israel, Germany 
and America helped launch the successful journal 
History & Memory in 1987. Oral historians in 
many countries have added their voices, and have 
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helped ensure that the study of "memory" is 
informed by a sensitivity to issues of gender. 
In much of this broad field ofwork, Foucault 
and Lacan have been the inspiration; other 
scholars have found much in the reflections of 
Lyotard or Kristeva about the ruins of symbolic 
language in the aftermath of the Holocaust. Post-
modernist interventions have returned time and 
again to memory, as a site of nostalgia. Some 
favour turning to the individual's stories as the 
cornerstone for the recovery of the subject, whose 
position is always in question. 
Others in the field of critical theory are 
sceptical about all the talk about memory. To 
Kerwin Klein, the memory boom is a betrayal of 
the radical credentials of critical theory, for it 
"marries hip new linguistic practices with some 
of the oldest senses of memory as a union of divine 
presence and material object." In some hands, 
Klein argues, the evocation of memory becomes a 
kind of"cultural religiosity," a "re-enchantment" 
of our sense of the past. 
By the 1990s these critical standpoints and 
innovative approaches clearly occupied an 
influential, though certainly not hegemonic, 
position in the discipline. Some style the sum of 
these contributions as the "linguistic turn," simply 
meaning the general acceptance that there are no 
historical "facts" separate from the language in 
which they are expressed in time and place. Others 
call it the "cultural turn," meaning the 
concentration on signifying practices in the past 
as a major focus of current historical research. 
Whatever it is termed, and whatever its 
origins, the tide has indeed turned, and cultural 
history is now all around us. It has benefitted from 
the influx of refugees from Marxist or marxisant 
history, who watched their historical paradigm 
disintegrate well before the Berlin Wall was 
breached. At times, cultural history has taken an 
entirely idealist turn, in the sense of suggesting 
that representations constitute the only reality. 
This is an extreme position, but it does exist. 
However configured, the "cultural turn" in 
historical study describes an agenda of real 
popularity and potential. Students are voting with 
their feet here: economic, demographic and labor 
history have not kept their audiences; to a degree, 
cultural history has drawn them away. 
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There is a time-lag in the way institutions 
respond to these intellectual trends in our 
profession. But by the 1990s it became apparent 
that the subject of cultural history was growing in 
popularity among students and scholars in such 
a way as to require appointments, grants, 
promotions, and so on. Reinforcing the trend is 
the way in which publishers respond positively to 
projects in cultural history, and less positively to 
other specialisms. Their reaction is part of the 
story I have tried to illustrate earlier tonight: 
cultural history sells. 
And not only in the academic market. Given 
the contraction of university jobs in history in 
Britain, and a steady state elsewhere in Europe, 
and given chronic instability and over supply in 
the American job market, the future of many 
younger scholars in the academy has been bleak 
indeed. One way forward for them - and not only 
for them - is into the expanding field of public 
history. And in this field, the subject of memory 
is de rigueur. The story of the Historial de la 
grande guerre is only one among many. 
All this is entirely invigorating, and an antidote 
to some of the conservative features of our 
discipline. Obstacles still remain. We must not 
underestimate the extent to which many historians 
consider "popularity" to be synonymous with 
"superficiality" and believe that any idea that is 
expressed clearly must be deeply flawed. Others 
find the subject of cultural history vague and the 
notion of memory perilously ill-defined. And at 
times they are right. 
One of the challenges of the next decade or so 
is to try to draw together some of these disparate 
strands of interest and enthusiasm through a more 
rigorous and tightly-argued set of propositions 
about what exactly memory is, and what it has 
been in the past. The only fixed point at this 
moment is the near ubiquity of the term. No one 
should delude herself into thinking we all use it 
the same way. But just as we use words like love 
and hate without ever knowing their full or shared 
significance, so we are bound to go on using the 
term "memory," the historical signature of our own 
generation. 
Jay Winter is currently Professor of Modern 
History at Yale University. 
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